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Executive Summary 
 
This paper is an attempt to add to our understanding of social media use during times 
of political and social crisis by presenting an analysis of the use of Twitter during a specific 
event: the terrorist attack in Garissa, Kenya in 2015. In particular: how networks were 
generated on the social media platform in the aftermath of this event; what these networks 
may be able to tell us about how information flows following democratic conflict events; and, 
what the type of actors located at the centre of these flows tell us about the nature of Twitter 
communication.  
x The results of the study show, at least in terms of the use of Twitter during the Garissa 
case study, that mainstream news organisations maintain a significant portion of their 
historical currency when it comes to both providing information and having information 
forwarded from their accounts. In particular, the BBC, CNN and Reuters emerged as 
key actors and network nodes.  
x Other actors emerged as important, particularly local bloggers and activists. These 
results point to the role of local social media µcelebrities¶ and activists in media 
ecologies. 
x Evidence of the broader challenge of self-published user-generated content (either in 
the form of single tweets and/or more formal publication) to µestablished¶ journalism did 
not materialise in the data analysed in this study, with our defined µBroadcasters¶ and 
µNetworkers¶ still dominated by established journalistic organisations. At least in terms 
of spread and sharing, this form of journalism was paramount. Thus, Twitter proved to 
be an important vehicle for mainstream journalism to both spread information and 
promote their brands during this particular event.  
x The results of the study, and the identification of the key network nodes also points to 
an issue raised in both popular and scholarly literature: the rather narrow levels of use 
of the platform, and the elite-centric nature of Twitter users. Unlike Facebook, which 
has much broader user base but tends to be used for fewer, or in-depth postings and 
comments, Twitter is a platform that lends itself well to µlive¶, on-the-spot updates 
(including videos and image) but has a much smaller number of users, many of whom 
are journalists, politicians, celebrities, activists. 
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Introduction 
In the tech world, a decade is a long time, and it is precisely ten years since Twitter 
was first launched in the summer of 2006. Over that decade, the social media platform has 
gone through a series of shifts in terms of both popularity and popular image. It would be fair 
to say that while platforms such as Facebook or YouTube were associated (at least in their 
formative years) with what we might describe as the informal/entertainment side of social 
media, Twitter cemented its reputation (internationally) via political events and social 
movements. The 2009 Iranian elections and subsequent protests, democratic uprisings in 
Tunisia, Egypt and Libya between 2010 and 2012, and the Gezi protests in Turkey in 2013 are 
but a few examples of events where Twitter is reported to have played a role in activist 
coordination and the spread of information (both inside and outside of the countries in 
question). The architecture of the Twitter platform²with its 140 character maximum, a 
relatively simple interface and a primacy of instantaneous communication²meant that it was 
often favoured for on-the-spot messaging over other platforms such as Facebook. The 
improvement in mobile connection and download speeds with the advent of 3G and 4G led to 
EHWWHUYLGHRDQGDXGLRFDSDELOLWLHVWKXVHQKDQFLQJ7ZLWWHU¶VUHDO-time utility. 
A fundamental task for researchers has been to not only more precisely describe and 
analyse the aforementioned role of social media platforms during times of protest, dissent, 
upheaval, violence or political crisis, but also to more precisely describe and analyse social 
media use'XULQJWKHHDUO\\HDUVRI7ZLWWHUIRUH[DPSOHWKHWHUP³7ZLWWHU5HYROXWLRQ´ZDV
bandied about in mainstream media outlets, suggesting a well-defined connection between 
social media use and political change. This popular technological discourse saw its start in 
relation to Iran in 2009, and its peak during the so-FDOOHG ³$UDE6SULQJ´EHWZHHQ2010 and 
2012. And, in the United States, much power was attributed to social media during the 2008 
Presidential elections, which saw Barack Obama come to power. In all of these cases, 
however, the popular understanding of both the use and role of social media was primarily 
anecdotal. For obvious temporal reasons, research was still thin on the ground, but as time 
has gone by, academic work on the use of platforms such as Twitter has shown that things 
are, in fact, more complicated than popular understanding(s) of social media would have us 
believe. 
In this paper, we will attempt to add further layers of nuance to our academic 
understanding of social media use during times of political and social crisis by presenting an 
analysis of the use of Twitter during a specific event: the terrorist attack in Garissa, Kenya 
(Garissa University College) in 2015. In particular, we will focus on the networks that were 
generated on the social media platform in the aftermath of this event, and what these networks 
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may be able to tell us about how information flows following democratic conflict events, and 
ZKDWWKHW\SHRIDFWRUVORFDWHGDWWKHFHQWUHRIWKHVHIORZVWKHµQRGHV¶DOVRWHOOXVDERXWWKH
nature of Twitter communication. It is important to note that this is not an analysis of the content 
of the tweets in question, but rather a presentation of the networks formed and the implications 
of those networks. The hope is that this chapter will allow for a greater understanding of who 
the central actors are during times of acute political and social crisis, and how that identification 
can help us to more precisely define the role of social media during such crises beyond vague 
QRWLRQVRISODWIRUPVDVVLPSO\µVRXUFHVRILQIRUPDWLRQ¶ 
Research/Theory 
The study of the use of Twitter has seen an exponential increase in recent years. As 
mentioned previously, the platform architecture, combined with smartphone ubiquity and 
LPSURYHGGRZQORDGDQGXSORDGVSHHGVKDYHDOOLPSDFWHG7ZLWWHU¶VUHSXWDWLRQDVDFHQWUDOFRJ
in the contemporary informational wheel. Within this cluster of research, scholars have become 
increasingly interested in the formation of networks surrounding political events, war and 
SURWHVW%HQQHWWSZURWHWKDWZKLOHµPDQ\DFWLYLVWVFLWHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRISersonal 
digital media in creating networks and coordinating action across diverse political identities and 
RUJDQL]DWLRQV¶ TXHVWLRQV UHPDLQHG UHJDUGLQJ WKH WUXH XVH HIILFDF\ DQG LPSDFW RI VXFK
WHFKQRORJLHVDQGWKHSUREOHPRIZKHWKHURUQRWµWKHHDVHRIMoining and leaving polycentric 
(multi-KXEEHG LVVXH QHWZRUNV¶ LELG OHDGV WR GLIILFXOWLHV LQ FRQWUROOLQJ DQG PDLQWDLQLQJ
movements. Of central importance to Bennett was the issue of if (and how) digital media 
allowed for the development of new forms of political networks which challenged mainstream, 
hierarchical systems. In examining the impact of digital media upon activists around the turn 
of the millennium, Bennett found that such media had a wide range of effects upon political 
DFWLYLVPµIURPRUJDQL]Dtional dynamics and patterns of change, to strategic political relations 
EHWZHHQ DFWLYLVWV RSSRQHQWV DQG VSHFWDWRU SXEOLFV¶ %HQQHWW DOVR QRWHG WKDW SDUWLFLSDWLRQ
SDWWHUQVZHUHLPSDFWHGE\FRPPXQLFDWLRQQHWZRUNVZKLFKDOORZHGFLWL]HQVWRµILQGPXOWLSOH
pRLQWVRIHQWU\LQWRYDULHWLHVRISROLWLFDODFWLRQ¶S 
Working off of this early research, and then building upon later work (e.g. Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2011; Bennett, et al., 2011), Bennett & Segerberg (2012) developed the theoretical 
IUDPHZRUNRI µFRQQHFWLYHDFWLRQ¶ LQFRQWUDVW WR WKHFRPPRQFRQFHSWRI µFROOHFWLYHDFWLRQ¶ WR
explain how digital media in general (and, in recent years, social media in particular) have 
contributed to the formation of loosely (and occasionally not-so-loosely) configured activist 
networks. Via connective action, individuals are able to participate (in vary degrees) in activism 
YLDVRFLDOQHWZRUNLQJV\VWHPVDQGLQWKLVIRUPRIDFWLRQµWDNLQJSXEOLFDFWLRQRUFRQWULEXWLQJ
to a common good becomes an act of personal expression or recognition or self-validation 
DFKLHYHG E\ VKDULQJ LGHDV DQG DFWLRQV LQ WUXVWHG UHODWLRQVKLSV¶ SS -3). Thus, while 
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traditional collective action is rooted in significant levels of centralised organisation, the 
creation of a collective identity and a significant investment of time and energy on the part of 
SDUWLFLSDQWV FRQQHFWLYH DFWLRQ LV IRXQG LQ µSHUVRQDOL]HG FRQWHQW VKDULQJ DFURVV PHGLD
QHWZRUNV¶S)RU%HQQHWW	6HJHUEHUJWZRIDFWRUVDUHNH\ZLWKLQUDWLRQDOLVHGFRQQHFWLYH
action: (1) a message or political statement which is easily transformed/personalised, and (2) 
the use of technologies such as social media which allow for these themes to be shared and 
further personalised. 
%HQQHWW 	 6HJHUEHUJ¶V UHVHDUFK RSHQHG XS D VHULHV RI TXestions regarding social 
media, networks and political communication: particularly in relation to issues such as weak 
and strong ties and the role of central nodes and opinion leaders. In relation to the second 
issue (central nodes and opinion leaders), an important strand of work within the study of social 
PHGLDKDVEHHQRQ WKDWRI µPHGLDHFRORJ\¶XVHG LQRUGHU WRGLVFXVV WKH LQWHUSOD\EHWZHHQ
ICT/social and legacy media, as well as the integration of the two (e.g., Scolari, 2012, 2013; 
Alexander & Aouragh, 2014; Cottle, 2011; Robertson, 2013; Tufekci & Wilson, 2012). In their 
study on the motivations to participate in the Tahrir Square protests, Tufekci & Wilson noted 
the need for a more complex understanding of political communication systems: 
Social media are just one portion of a new system of political communication that 
KDVHYROYHGLQ1RUWK$IULFDDQGWKH0LGGOH(DVW«WKHFRQQHFWLYLW\LQIUDVWUXFWXUH
should be analyzed as a complex ecology rather than in terms of any specific 
platform or device. This new system involves three broad, interrelated components. 
First, satellite TV channels such as Al-Jazeera contributed to the formation of a 
new kind of public sphere in the Arab world (Howard, 2010, Lynch, 2006; Nisbet & 
Myers, 2010). Second, the rapid diffusion of the Internet and the rise of dedicated 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter dramatically changed the infrastructure of 
social connectivity (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Radsch, 2008). Third, the falling costs 
and expanding capabilities of mobile phones have enriched dispersed 
communication with picture and video capabilities. In the span of a decade, 
societies in which it had long been difficult to access information were transformed 
into massive social experiments fuelled by an explosion in channels of information 
(Bailard, 2009; Howard, 2010) (p.365). 
This view was reflected in the work of Alexander & Aouragh (2014) - also writing about 
(J\SW¶VµXQILQLVKHG5HYROXWLRQ¶- who note that instead of defining social media use or a given 
platform as either SRVLWLYHRUQHJDWLYHDQG LQVWHDGRIXWLOLVLQJD µGHWHUPLQLVWLF¶DSSURDFK WR
addressing online and offline media, it is far more productive to consider how different activist 
SUDFWLFHVFDQEHFRQQHFWHGWRDµODUJHUPHGLDHFRORJ\¶S7KXVWKHIRFXs should not 
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be on a comparison of the affordances of particular platforms, or their relative efficacy in the 
spread of pro- or anti-democratic messages, but rather to what extent and how the media 
technologies that existed in particular places and particular times interacted, as species do 
within an ecosystem.  
In terms of network analysis and an understanding of the relationship between social 
PHGLDSODWIRUPVDQGHVWDEOLVKHGPHGLD ZKDWZHPLJKWFDOO ³SUH-VRFLDOPHGLDPHGLD´ WKH
notion of media ecology makes a theoretical appeal for an increased understanding of the 
extent to which social media networks serve to either reinforce or undermine traditional 
authority. This is an issue addressed by Aday, et al. (2013) in their discussion of the concept 
RI ³GLVLQWHUPHGLDWLRQ´ ZLWKLQ ZKLFK HOLWHJDWHNHHSLQJ LV FRQVLGHUHG WR EH LQ WKH SURFHVVRI
collapsing, ushering in a new age where horizontal sharing and peer production will erode 
traditional media power. Those who argue against the concept, on the other hand, consider 
large media corporations to have maintained their capital, with citizens simply picking material 
from the mainstream flow²this reinforcing mainstream agenda setting power²while simply 
attaching their own interpretations and biases to that information. 
In order to get at these nuances within Twitter (and other social media), studies of 
networks have shown to be useful. Rainie (2014; in Getchell, 2015), for example, made note 
RIVL[W\SHVRI7ZLWWHU³FRQYHUVDWLRQV´GLYLGHGXQLILHGIUagmented, (4) clustered, (5) 
in-hub & spoke, and (6) outhub & spoke. In their classification of Twitter networks in relation to 
politics, Smith et al. (2014) went into further detail by clarifying the types of conversations that 
take place within these network types²ZKDWWKH\GHVFULEHGDV³FRQYHUVDWLRQDODUFKHW\SHV´
The following are the most relevant to the current study:  
x Polarized Crowd: two big and dense groups that have little connection between 
them. Topics discussed are often highly divisive and heated political subjects. 
Usually little conversation between these groups despite the fact that they are 
focused on the same topic. Not arguing, they are ignoring one another while 
pointing to different web resources and using different hashtags. Shows that 
partisan Twitter users rely on different information sources: liberals link to many 
mainstream news sources, conservatives link to a different set of websites. 
x Tight Crowd: highly interconnected people with few isolated participants. These 
structures show how networked learning communities function and how sharing 
and mutual support can be facilitated by social media.  
x Community Clusters: Popular topics may develop multiple smaller groups, 
which often form around a few hubs each with its own audience, influencers, and 
sources of information. Global news stories often attract coverage from many 
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news outlets, each with its own following. That creates a collection of medium-
sized groups²and a fair number of isolates. These can illustrate diverse angles 
on a subject based on its relevance to different audiences, revealing a diversity of 
opinion and perspective on a social media topic. 
x Broadcast Network: Twitter commentary around breaking news stories and 
output of well-known media outlets and pundits has distinctive hub and spoke 
structure in which many people repeat what prominent news and media 
organisations tweet. Members of the Broadcast Network audience often 
connected only to the hub news source, without connecting to one another. There 
are still powerful agenda setters and conversation starters in the new social media 
world: enterprises and personalities with loyal followings can still have a large 
impact on the conversation. 
Clearly, these conversational archetypes²the Polarized Crowd and Broadcast 
Network groupings in particular²serve as useful models for considering the networks that 
could emerge from an analysis of Twitter following terrorist attacks in Kenya. Getchell (2015) 
notes that during times of crisis or conflict, an argument could be made based on the Smith et 
al. (2014) model for a combination of Broadcast and Community clusters: 
Government agencies as well as highly recognized and credible media 
organizations often provide consistent and influential information during crises. By 
contrast, TwittHUFRQYHUVDWLRQVLQ&RPPXQLW\&OXVWHUVUHIOHFW³GLYHUVHDQJOHVRQD
subject based on its relevance to different audiences, revealing a diversity of 
RSLQLRQ DQG SHUVSHFWLYH RQ D VRFLDO PHGLD WRSLF´ 6PLWK HW DO S  ,Q
communicating before, during, and after a crisis event, it could be argued that 
different types/forms of networks would be most effective. (p. 600) 
,QUHODWLRQWRZKDWZHPLJKWFODVVLI\DVWKH³LGHDOW\SH´FRPPXQLFDWLRQGLVFXVVHGE\
Smith et al. (2012), Theocharis (2012) notes that Social Network Analysis indicates that, ³WKH
more ties an account has, the better connected it is. A better-connected account on Twitter 
may be able to more effectively influence the network through the messages it tweets because 
it can make many others aware of the valuable information it potentially holds, or widely and 
LQVWDQWO\FRPPXQLFDWHLWVYLHZV´S7KXVZLWKWKHVHQHWZRUNILJXUHVKROGLQJDSRVLWLRQ
RI³FHQWUDOLW\´ZHUHWXUQWRFRUHPHGLDDQGFRPPXQLFDWLRQVWKHRU\ZLWKLQIOXHQWLDODFWRUVDWWKH
core of nodes influencing both the tone and direction of platform-based discussions (e.g. de 
Fresno Garcia, 2016 pp. 30-31).  
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An understanding of how these networks and nodes will be identified will be discussed 
in the next section. 
Methodology 
Traditionally, studies on the use of Twitter and conflict start with a hypothesis on how it 
was used during a particular conflict and then generate empirical data to test the validity of that 
very hypothesis. This study however, takes a different approach by using the grounded theory 
method to collect empirical data without any perceived hypothesis or assumptions, and then 
try to identify patterns that lead to findings, which in turn, could be developed into a better 
understanding of the use of technology in a time of conflict. The aim is to understand what the 
structural features of Twitter communication were and how the various actors on Twitter 
leveraged the technology.  
Using the Mecodify1 open-source tool, we collected Twitter data based on a search 
query with hashtags related to Garissa attack, which was a terrorist attack that took place on 
2 April 2015 when gunmen stormed the Garissa University College in the city of Garissa, which 
led to the killing of 148 people and the injury of at least 79. The militant group and Al-Qaeda 
offshoot, Al-Shabaab, which the gunmen claimed to be from, took responsibility for the attack. 
The hashtags used for the search were #Garissa and #GarissaAttack.  
We chose this case since it had substantial activity on Twitter at the time. The aim is to 
examine, using social network analysis (SNA), if it is possible to identify how the Twitter 
network around the case was formed over time and who were the main actors involved in the 
network. As Borgatti (2009) notes: 
A key task of social network analysis has been to invent graph-theoretic properties 
that characterize structures, positions, and dyadic properties (such as the cohesion 
RUFRQQHFWHGQHVVRIWKHVWUXFWXUHDQGWKHRYHUDOO³VKDSH´LHGLVWULEXWLRQRIWLHV
At the node level of analysis, the most widely studied concept is centrality²a family 
of node level properties relating to the structural importance or prominence of a 
node in the network. (p. 894) 
&RQFUHWHO\61$³FRQFHSWXDOL]HVVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHDVDQHWZRUNZLWKWLHVFRQQHcting 
members and channelling resources, (2) focuses on the characteristics of ties rather than on 
WKH FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI WKH LQGLYLGXDO PHPEHUV DQG  YLHZV FRPPXQLWLHV DV µSHUVRQDO
FRPPXQLWLHV¶WKDWLVDVQHWZRUNVRILQGLYLGXDOUHODWLRQVWKDWSHRSOHfoster, maintain, and use 
LQWKHFRXUVHRIWKHLUGDLO\OLYHV´³:HWKHUHOOHWDO-|UJHQVSS-5; citing 
Wasserman and Faust 1994, p.5) notes, µ>7@KHXQLWRIDQDO\VLVLQQHWZRUNDQDO\VLVLVQRWWKH
                                                          
1 Read more about Mecodify here: http://mecodem.eu/mecodify 
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individual, but an entity consisting oIDFROOHFWLRQRILQGLYLGXDOVDQGWKHOLQNDJHVDPRQJWKHP´
7KXVE\IRFXVLQJµRQG\DGVWZRDFWRUVDQGWKHLUWLHVWULDGVWKUHHDFWRUVDQGWKHLUWLHVRU
ODUJHUV\VWHPVVXEJURXSVRILQGLYLGXDOVRUHQWLUHQHWZRUNV¶LELG61$LQIHUVLQIOXHQFHIURP
DQ DFWRU¶V UHODWLRQDO SRVLWLRQ LQ SROLF\ QHWZRUNV UDWKHU WKDQ WKHLU LQGLYLGXDO SUHIHUHQFHV RU
FDSDFLWLHV´$VDQRWHRQOLPLWDWLRQV%RVFKSSRLQWVRXWWKDWZKLOH61$FDQVKRZ
relationships in communities, it is limited by the fact that it provLGHV³VWDWLFVQDSVKRWVZKLOH
QHJOHFWLQJWKHQHWZRUN¶VG\QDPLFV´WKXVQRWUHYHDOLQJWKHTXDOLW\RIWKHWZHHWVEXWRQO\WKH
IUHTXHQF\´ %RVFK GRHV QRWH KRZHYHU WKDW 61$ SURYLGHV D ³XVHIXO VHQVH RI UHODWLRQVKLS
FOXVWHUVDQGLQIOXHQFH´,ELG 
Data collection 
Mecodify has a built-LQVFULSWWKDWFUDZOVWZLWWHU¶VVHDUFKSDJHDQGH[WUDFWVWKHWZHHW
,'V WKDW HPHUJH IURP VHDUFK TXHULHV ,W WKHQ IHHGV WKH WZHHW ,'V WR 7ZLWWHU¶V $SSOLFDWLRQ
Program Interfaces (APIs), which then fetch the Twitter messages and all relevant information 
about the tweeter2.  
As shown in Table 1, the size of the corpus for each of the two cases was quite substantial. 
Country and conflict case Tweets total Users total Period 
Garissa terrorist Attack 68,892 28,418 2-8 Apr 2015 
Table 1: number of tweets and users and the sampling period for the two cases 
 
The period chosen was one full week starting on the day of the attack. Twitter data was 
extracted using a search query with the hashtags #Garissa and #GarissaAttack. While it is not 
possible to collect all relevant tweets using hashtags, they are useful to identify the actors that 
wish to signify their interest in taking advantage of the hashtag to contribute to the public 
discussion. Among the limitations of using hashtags is their inability to cover follow-up replies 
and other related messages since such tweets may not necessarily include the hashtag used 
in the original tweet. Additionally, tweets relevant to the conflict that do not have the hashtag 
would be missed. 
To identify and analyse the network of communication between the various tweeters, 
which are also called nodes, messages containing mentions (using the @tweeter format) were 
identified and directional edges were visually drawn between every two connected nodes with 
an arrow pointing to a node indicating the fact that the source node mentioned the target node. 
Only one directed edge is drawn per two nodes. However, two nodes could very well have two 
links indicating a two-way method of communication. This was possible to achieve using one 
                                                          
2 The term tweeter refers to the Twitter account holder that published a tweet. 
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RI0HFRGLI\¶VEXLOW-in functions that allows exporting the lists of nodes and edges for importing 
into another networking platform called Kumu, which is a data visualisation platform that helps 
organise complex information into interactive relationship maps3. 
Social network analysis 
Kumu was used to carry out basic social analysis functions to identify the most actively 
communicating actors over time. In order to analyse progress during the week, the first day 
was partitioned to three parts, starting with the first hour after the first tweet about the attack. 
The second part contains the first six after the attack while the third covers the whole period 
until the end of the first day. All times used were in GMT, which is the standard time used by 
the Twitter API.  
Since social network analysis requires nodes (tweeters) and edges (tweets connecting 
two tweeters), it was necessary to define exactly what constitutes an edge. While other studies 
used followers and retweets, in this study, we decided to use two ways of connecting two 
nodes: 
- A Twitter username mention: This is the most common and is triggered when the 
WZHHWHU LQFOXGHV D 7ZLWWHU XVHUQDPH VWDUWLQJ ZLWK WKH µ#¶ VLJQ $Q\ PHQWLRQ RI D
particular username usually triggers an alert at the end of the mentioned user. A tweet 
can include several mentions and a tweeter can even mention his/her own username. 
- A reply tweet: Twitter allows users to click on a button below any tweet to reply to that 
particular tweet. Tweets are easily identifiable as replies through the Twitter APIs and 
Mecodify identifies them as such. Similarly, a reply can also be to a user. Any tweeter 
could also send a public message directly to the user by clicking on his/her username 
on Twitter. This is different to a mention given that it is meant exclusively to one user. 
Every reply to a tweet is also considered as a reply to the user. Hence replies to a 
particular user could also theoretically contain a subset of replies to one or more of 
his/her tweets. 
Our justification in preferring replies and comments is due to the fact that replying or mentioning 
another user usually involves more effort than a retweet and signifies a greater deal of 
engagement. Furthermore, the Twitter API makes access to this information much easier than 
UHWZHHWVDQGIROORZHUV¶GDWD6LQFHSULYDWHPHVVDJHVDUHQRWSXEOLFWKH\ZHUHQRWLQFOXGHGLQ
this study. 
 
                                                          
3 dŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŽĞǆƚƌĂĐƚ ?ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĚǀŝƐƵĂůŝƐĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐǁĂƐĚŽŶĞĂƐƉĞƌŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚŽŶDĞĐŽĚŝĨǇ ?Ɛ'ŝƚŚƵďŵĂŶƵĂů
at https://github.com/wsaqaf/mecodify/blob/master/manual.md  
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Analysis & Findings 
In this section, we analyse and present findings in two different areas. The first deals 
with the formation of the network over time while the second is more of a detailed analysis on 
the characteristics of the actors that formed the network. 
The activity on Twitter measured in terms of original tweets ±and not retweets- in 
relation to the Garissa attack took place after 03:30 GMT in the morning of April 2 (07:30 Kenya 
time) and continued to the end of the day. As Figure 1 shows, the activity subsided in the 
subsequent days with the tops covering the period during 10.00-22.00 of each of the seven 
days.  
 
Figure 1: Garissa attack-related Twitter activity (original tweets) during 1-8 April 2015 
The first replies captured by Mecodify with the #Garissa hashtag emerged as dispersed 
number of tweets and some replies in relation to the attack. During the first hour, those 
interactions did not appear to have a central or dominant actor as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: The networks of responses in the first hour after the first tweet about the attack 
Social analysis network metrics such as betweenness4 and closeness5 centrality are 
not useful at this stage since the network was fragmented. 
However, over six hours after the first tweet, new networks emerged and some of the 
old ones started to expand as can be seen in Figure 4. One of those networks, whose central 
node is marked with a red circle, started forming faster than the others. That central node 
represented the Twitter account of Robert Talai (@robertalai), who identifies himself as 
³.HQ\D¶VPRVWUHVSHFWHGDQGUHOLDEOHEORJJHU´:LWh over 400,000 followers, he had several 
tweets about the Garissa attack that were retweeted and responded to.  
                                                          
4 In social network analysis, a node's betweenness centrality measures how central its position is in the network. It is 
calculated by summing the number of shortest paths from all nodes that go through the node. 
5 Closeness centrality is calculated by measuring the distances or hops from the node to all other nodes in the network 
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Figure 3: The networks of responses about 6 hour after the first tweet about the attack 
Furthermore, when calculating the degree centrality6 for the top nodes, @robertalai got 
the top spot by far, indicating stronger connectivity in the emerging network. Additionally, he 
had the highest indegree7 measure. 
At the end of the first day, it becomes quite clear that the network around @robertalai 
was the most active as can be seen in Figure 5. Additionally, smaller sub-networks connected 
to the direct network of @robertalai were also strengthened.  
                                                          
6 Degree centrality is a is calculated by counting the number of connections  ?when sending or receiving a twitter response - 
an element has. In general, elements with high degree are the main connectors in the network. 
7 The Indegree metric corresponds to the number of incoming connections for an element. In general, elements with high 
indegree are the leaders of the network. In the case of the analysis in this study, a high indegree means that the person 
receives a high number of responses from others. 
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Figure 4:  The networks of responses at the end of the first day on which the attack happened 
Although the network has grown considerably at the end of the day, there were still 
many fragmented and isolated smaller networks existing in parallel. The leadership of 
@robertalai in terms of degree centrality remained high. But the margin between the leader 
and the second and third nodes had started to shrink. In second place a freelance journalist 
with user name @daudoo succeeded in getting many responses despite his low number of 
followers.  
At this point, mainstream media started to stand out as demonstrated by 
@BBCBreaking, which is the Twitter account for BBC that specialises in breaking news. With 
over 22 million followers, it was a mammoth in terms of influence on Twitter compared to all 
other local Kenyan actors. Nonetheless, the number of responses it received did not match 
those of @robertalai.  
The @BBCBreaking was followed by @juliegichuru, which belongs to Julie Churu, a 
self-SURFODLPHG ³$IUR-RSWLPLVW ZLIH PRWKHU FKDQJH DJHQW FKLOG RI *RG´ 6KH KDG more 
followers than @robertalai and appeared to form her own sub-network that started rivaling that 
of @robertalai. All other tweeters were well below them. 
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By the end of the sampling period of seven days, the network had grown considerably 
as shown in Figure 6 and the influential actors that have established themselves remained in 
the same order in terms of degree centrality and indegree metrics. In other words, the tweeters 
that got the most traction and acted swiftly in covering the developments round the Garissa 
attack from the beginning were the ones that prevailed and gained the most in terms of 
interaction based on the social network analysis metrics. 
 
Figure 5: The networks of responses at the end of the seven-day period 
 
Actor groups of the Garissa attack-related Twitter network 
While the earlier analysis focused on how the network formed over time, we took a 
more comprehensive approach when dealing with the fully formed seven-day-old network by 
looking into the actual actors that compose it.  
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The study found that out of 28,418 tweeters, around 42 per cent were involved in some 
form of a network using one or more of the methods described earlier, i.e., mentions or replies.  
Upon delving deeper into the data, it became apparent that the type and level of 
networking activity did reveal some traits of the tweeters themselves, and hence helped shed 
light on their role and type of contribution ±if any- to the network.  
The analysis has unveiled four groups of users that were assessed based on the 
number of replies (including direct tweet replies) and the number of mentions they got and they 
sent. The groups are described as follows.  
Group 1: Broadcasters 
This group includes users that received responses and mentions from other tweeters 
yet did not respond or mention anyone back at all during the sample period. When sorting the 
list by the amount of mentions and responses they got, it was possible to identify some 
common traits, at least in the main actors of this group.  
The highest on the list was the account of Joseph K Boinnet, the Second Inspector 
General of Police in Kenya. Despite the fact that he only posted a single tweet8, he got 279 
mentions and replies sent from other tweeters. Since the incident involved a terrorist attack, it 
was not surprising that his account would be among the highest mentioned. However, it was 
clear that the account was used for one-way announcing a statement or broadcasting rather 
than as part of a social network to engage and interact with other users. The next four most 
mentioned tweeters in this group were well-established mainstream media accounts, namely 
@CNN, @Reuters,  @StandardKenya and @cnni (CNN International). Unlike the rest, 
@StandardKenya, which represents The Standard Newspaper, is a national actor. It 
represents one of the largest broadsheets in Kenya and is owned by The Standard Group, a 
media conglomerate that also owns the Kenyan Television Network, which was also active on 
Twitter.  
The group can be characterised by being led by popular traditional or establishment-
type accounts that have held the Verified by Twitter label9. They also have a high median value 
of followers10 exceeding two thousand. They seem to use Twitter as a means of broadcasting 
their messages and not social interaction despite the significant number of mentions they get. 
                                                          
8 It is note-worthy that a second tweet was posted on February 9th, which is not included in this sample, simply stating that 
ƚŚĞ ?'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƉŽůŝĐĞŽĨficers' funeral expenses (vide #Garissa) but friends and family are free to raise 
ĨƵŶĚƐ ? ?
9 sĞƌŝĨŝĞĚdǁŝƚƚĞƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐĂƌĞƐƵƉƉŽƐĞĚůǇŐĞŶƵŝŶĞƐŝŶĐĞůĞŐĂůĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŽǁŶĞƌƐ ?ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽ
get that status. 
10 Median was used to assess followers due to the high standard deviation this variable. If the average is to be used, it 
would create a substantial bias for the few users who have millions of followers. 
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In total, this group had 1,499 tweeters representing five per cent of the total in the dataset as 
shown in Table 1, which also shows the top five accounts in that group. 
Table 1: Top 5 tweeter in Group 1 (sorted by number of replies+mentions received) 
Top five 
accounts -> @JBoinnet @CNN @Reuters 
@StandardK
enya @cnni 
For whole 
group  
(N=1,499) 
Is the 
account 
verified? 
No11 Yes Yes Yes Yes 7% verified 
Number of 
followers 56176 24,958,313 12,996,254 594,353 5,025,672 
2,105 
(median) 
Tweets on 
the conflict 1 1 7 9 11 
2,98 
(average) 
Retweets of 
those tweets 24 311 2015 74 2,217 
57,17 
(average) 
       
Replies 
received 44 35 48 25 21 
1,02  
(average) 
Mentions 
received 235 231 198 120 118 
3,46  
(average) 
       
Replies sent 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mentions 
sent 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Group 2: Trolls 
This group constitutes of tweeters that send responses and mentions to others but do 
not get any response. They are part of the network because they impose themselves using the 
reply and mentioning techniques. However, their efforts to gain attention seem to go nowhere 
based on the lack of reaction to their frantic tweets. The list of the top most active in replying 
and mentioning others includes personal individuals, whose accounts are hidden for privacy 
concerns. However, among the top 5 are accounts that appear to possibly be spam or bot 
accounts that keep on sending repetitive tweets but to different usernames, which is a good 
reason to ignore.  
Several of the top accounts in terms of tweeting to others were detected by a bot-
detecting app called BotorNot to have a high probability of being a bot. A Pearson linear 
correlation test between the number of tweets and the number of times those accounts sent or 
mentioned others resulted in a significant coefficient value (R=0.64) and is statistically 
significant since p value was quite small. In other words, many of those accounts appear to 
KDYHWDNHQDGYDQWDJHRIWKHFRQIOLFW¶VKDVKWDJWRDGGPHQWLRQVRIRWKer users perhaps in an 
attempt to gain traction. The more active those users are, the more likely that they will be 
                                                          
11 As of December 1, 2016, is verified but the data used in this study was extracted several months back when the account 
was not yet verified. 
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spamming someone instead of contributing to a debate. This part of the network is apparently 
the one perceived the most harmful or at least most annoying. 
Despite constituting over 8,000 usernames or 28 per cent of the total sample, the 
average number of retweets and median value of followers is much lower compared to Group 
1. Additionally, only two per cent have verified accounts, out of whom none are in among the 
most active spammers as shown in Table 2.  
Table 2: Top 5 tweeter in Group 2 (sorted by number of replies+mentions sent)  
Top five 
accounts -> @<user1> @<user2> @<user3> @<user4> @<user5> 
For whole 
group  
(N=8,006) 
Is the 
account 
verified? 
No No No No No 2% verified 
Number of 
followers 779 24 10,518 3,068 8,57 
587 
(median) 
Tweets on 
the conflict 35 36 50 28 27 
2.35 
(average) 
Retweets of 
those 
tweets 
27 13 17 2 7 1.94 (average) 
       
Replies 
received 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mentions 
received 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Replies sent 30 33 4 26 19 0.59 (average) 
Mentions 
sent 63 34 54 32 38 
2.07 
(average) 
 
It is worth noting that it is not enough to assess the number of mentions and replies 
sent to others to determine whether such accounts are used for spamming. What is also 
important is to take into consideration the number of nodes that those accounts send to. If they 
were many, this would appear to be a form of spamming. But if it is, for example, many replies 
but persistently to the same account, this may indicate an intentional target. In this study, we 
use the ratio of edges to nodes to eliminate the extremes.  
Group 3: Orphans 
This group includes those tweeters that are not connected to any of the networks since 
they neither receive from nor send to other tweeters. Members of this group surprisingly 
exceeded 16,000 accounts, which constituted 58 per cent of the sample. It meant that the 
majority of the users are in fact practically not connected to any network. It is difficult to identify 
a common characteristic for all members of this group. But there may be several reasons why 
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they have not interacted with any other tweeter. While no interaction for less frequent tweeters 
is plausible, it would be interesting to examine the reasons why high frequency tweeters opted 
to not interact. 
When sorting the list by number of tweets in descending order, we find that the top four 
are accounts for services or platforms and not individual. The top account @AyotzinapaFeed 
for example is a service that sends feeds in Spanish probably in the form of automated 
retweets. Such uses do not require utilising social networking since they are mostly automated. 
The other three accounts seem to also offer services while the fifth is of an individual whose 
username is kept anonymous in Table 3.  
Like Group 2, this group had a low percentage of verified accounts (2 per cent) and low 
average median number of followers.  They were considerably less active and have fewer 
retweets on average. Table 3: Top five tweeter in Group 3 (sorted by number of tweets)  
Top five 
accounts -> 
@Ayotzinap
aFeed @Tupashe 
@TTMobile_
gh @Rondera @<user5> 
For whole 
group  
(N=16,362) 
Is the 
account 
verified? 
No No No No No 2% verified 
Number of 
followers 6,630 9,054 1,241 1,980 1,511 
411 
(median) 
Tweets on 
the conflict 105 66 54 46 46 
1.42 
(average) 
Retweets of 
those 
tweets 
27 0 24 0 3 1.42 (average) 
       
Replies 
received 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mentions 
received 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       
Replies sent 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mentions 
sent 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Group 4: Networkers 
The last group is perhaps the true engine of the network since it includes tweeters that 
engage in two-way interactions through replies and/or mentions. While they constitute about 
nine per cent of the sample (2,551 tweeters), they have the highest engagement with an 
average of about nine received mentions/responses and seven sent mentions/responses. 
There was a clear positive correlation (R=0.76) between the level of interaction and the number 
of retweets those users get.  
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When sorting the tweeters in this group by  total number of connections, i.e., incoming 
replies and mentions plus outgoing replies and mentions, one cannot but notice the dominance 
of BBC accounts (@BBCBreaking, @BBCWorld and @BBCAfrica), which have taken an 
approach different than that of @CNN and @Reuters of Group 1 and used mentions and 
replies in their tweets. Despite having fewer followers than the media accounts in Group 1, the 
leaders of this group approached the Garissa attack with more tweets and more interaction 
with other active tweeters. This seems to have succeeded in strengthening their network by 
using social media in more strategic ways compared to the broadcasting approach of Group 
1. 
Among the top in this networking group was no other than @RobertAlai, who as 
described in an earlier section, was the most active node at the beginning of the Twitter 
discussions around the Garissa attack. While he came in as a close second after 
@BBCBreaking in terms of tweets, he outperformed the BBC accounts by more than two to 
one as Table 4 shows.  
Table 4: Top five tweeter in Group 4 (sorted by total number of connections) 
Top five 
accounts -> BBCBreaking RobertAlai BBCWorld BBCAfrica 
bonifacemwa
ngi 
For whole 
group  
(N=2,551) 
Is the 
account 
verified? 
Yes No12 Yes Yes No13 5% verified 
Number of 
followers 22,470,284 401,811 14,218,601 1,259,935 372,653 
2,105 
(median) 
Tweets on 
the conflict 16 137 17 50 49 
8.8 
(average) 
Retweets of 
those tweets 9,361 8,165 6,546 4,206 3,728 
65.5 
(average) 
       
Replies 
received 149 298 89 101 84 
2,2 
(average) 
Mentions 
received 359 1034 333 362 283 
6,9 
(average) 
       
Replies sent 7 12 2 1 10 1,6 (average) 
Mentions 
sent 6 28 2 8 25 
5,7 
(average) 
 
                                                          
12 As of December 1, 2016, is verified but the data used in this study was extracted several months back when the account 
was not yet verified. 
 
13 As of December 1, 2016, is verified but the data used in this study was extracted several months back when the account 
was not yet verified. 
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It is noteworthy that the Twitter account of human rights activist and photojournalist 
Boniface Mwangi @bonifacemwangi had also performed well and came in fifth place in terms 
of retweets. The fact that his account had tweeted actively and interacted with other tweeters 
may have bolstered his role in the network significantly.  
While not shown in Table 4, other active nodes in the network included Kenya-based 
media such as Kenya Television Network Kenya (@KTNKenya), which took a more interactive 
approach to tweeting compared to its sister company @StandardKenya despite the fact that 
the two companies are managed by the same media group.  
Finally, it is also worth noting that the Kenya Red Cross account @KenyaRedCross 
was among the most active in receiving mentions and responses as well as engaging with 
others. Given the high number of casualties caused by the attack, this was expected. By 
DFWLYHO\UHVSRQGLQJWRDFRXSOHRIRWKHUWZHHWVGLUHFWO\LWKDGWDNHQDGYDQWDJHRIZKDW7ZLWWHU¶V
social networking capabilities.    
The emergence and expansion of the Garissa attack Twitter network as described in 
the earlier section was mainly the outcome of the active members of this networking group 
since they had a two-way mode of communication that social media in general are suitable for. 
The power of such networks reveals their potential more clearly when dealing with time-
sensitive news and information about emergencies such as terrorist attacks and other forms 
of sudden violent conflicts.  
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Figure 6: Comparison between the four groups 
)LJXUHVXPPDULVHVWKHILQGLQJVFRQFHUQLQJWKRVHJURXSVWKDWIRUPHGWKH*DULVVD¶V
Twitter network. It is important to warn however that simple comparison in terms of size may 
not always be valid since not all networkers succeed in striking the balance between the level 
of outgoing and incoming messages on Twitter. There is a range on that diagonal line shown 
in the illustration where each twitter account could potentially be. So a networker that is 99 per 
cent of the time tweeting others and just getting 1 per cent response to his/her tweet may be 
closer to a spammer than a networker. The same applies to those who rarely respond back 
despite a high number of mentions.  
The bottom line is that while anyone can be a Twitter user and talk about a conflict, 
those who truly engage and interact could be influential in their own network and settings. 
Moving along fixed horizontal or vertical lines like spammers and broadcasters do not appear 
to foster and grow Twitter networks. True networkers are the only ones who could fill the void 
by effectively implementing two-way conversations, especially when the subject matter is 
about a conflict. 
Conclusions 
The results of this study of the Garissa attacks provide a wealth of valuable information, 
but three issues in particular stick out as important implications of the study: (1) the relationship 
to disintermediation and media ecology; (2) the implications of the results for the relationship 
22 
 
between journalism and the use of ICT; and (3) the reach and influence of a relatively small 
QXPEHURIXVHUVWKHRSLQLRQOHDGHUVWKHSULPDF\RIZKDWDUHGHILQHGDVµ2USKDQV¶DQGµ7UROOV¶ 
$V GLVFXVVHG SUHYLRXVO\ WKH QRWLRQ RI µGLVLQWHUPHGLDWLRQ¶ LV RQH ZLWKLQ ZKLFK HOLWH
gatekeeping is in the process of collapsing, with horizontal sharing and peer production eroding 
µWUDGLWLRQDO¶PHGLDSRZHU$VDOVRQRWHGWKRVHZKRDUJXHDJDLQVWWKHFRQFHSWVHHODUJHPHGLD
corporations maintaining their power to both provide information and set the agenda, with 
citizens often selecting material from a mainstream flow, and the simply attaching their own 
interpretations and biases to that information. The results of the study show, at least in terms 
of the use of Twitter during the Garissa case study, that mainstream news organisations 
maintain a significant portion of their historical currency when it comes to both providing 
information and having information forwarded from their accounts. In particular, the BBC, CNN 
and Reuters emerged as key actors and network nodes.  
Interestingly, however, other actors emerged as important, particularly local bloggers 
and activists such as Robert Alai and Boniface Mwangi. As networkers in particular, these two 
managed to generate a significant number of retweets for their material despite far lower 
follower numbers than their large, mainstream media counterparts. These results also point to 
WKHUROHRIORFDOVRFLDOPHGLDµFHOHEULWLHV¶DQGDFWLYLVWVLQPHGLDHFRORJLHVDVZHOODVKRZODUJH
multinational news organisations retain their power: an issue in the case of African nations that 
SRLQWVWRWKHUROHRIWKHPHGLDRIIRUPHUFRORQLDOSRZHUVVXFKDV%ULWDLQ¶V%%&LQVKDSLQJ
coverage. What is clear from this case study is that during this particular crisis, users went to 
large-scale sources, or sources of their region that were well-known. 
Related to the issues of disintermediation and ecology is the broader question of the 
relationship between journalism and ICT/social media during a democratisation conflict such 
as the Garissa terror attack. Part of the disintermediation argument is that, by virtue of the 
DELOLW\RI ³RUGLQDU\FLWL]HQV´DQGVPDOO-scale organisations to produce, publish, promote and 
share their material, mainstream media lose a small or large portion of their gatekeeping and 
storytelling power. Evidence of the broader challenge of self-published user-generated content 
HLWKHULQWKHIRUPRIVLQJOHWZHHWVDQGRUPRUHIRUPDOSXEOLFDWLRQWRµHVWDEOLVKHG¶MRXUQDOLVP
did not materialise in the data analysed in this study, with the our definHGµ%URDGFDVWHUV¶DQG
µ1HWZRUNHUV¶ VWLOO GRPLQDWHG E\ HVWDEOLVKHG MRXUQDOLVWLF RUJDQLVDWLRQV $W OHDVW LQ WHUPV RI
spread and sharing, this form of journalism was paramount, with the noted exceptions of 
Robert Alai and Boniface Mwangi. Thus, Twitter proved to be an important vehicle for 
mainstream journalism to both spread information and promote their brands during this 
particular event.  
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The results of the study, and the identification of the key network nodes also points to 
an issue raised in both popular and scholarly literature: the rather narrow levels of use of the 
platform, and the elite-centric nature of Twitter users. Unlike Facebook, which has much 
broader user base but tends to be used for fewer, or in-depth postings and comments, Twitter 
is a plDWIRUPWKDWOHQGVLWVHOIZHOOWRµOLYH¶RQ-the-spot updates (including videos and image but 
has a much smaller number of users, many of whom are journalists, politicians, celebrities, 
activists. This is borne out in the fact that the total number of tweetVIURPWKHµ1HWZRUNHUV¶DQG
µ%URDGFDVWHUV¶URXJKO\ZDVRXWQXPEHUHGE\WKRVHIURPµ7UROOV¶DQGµ2USKDQV¶URXJKO\
24,000). This fact leads to an important methodological and theoretical issue in relation to the 
study of Twitter in connection with democratisation conflicts: that many of the tweets and 
comments regarding these issues disappear into the digital soup that is the Twitterverse. The 
VWXG\RIWKHµ%URDGFDVWHUV¶DQGµ1HWZRUNHUV¶WHOOVXVZKDWLQIOXHQFHUVDUHVD\LQJRQ7ZLWWHU
and how they might use the platform, but the practical problems of researching thousands of 
LQGLYLGXDOµRUSKDQ¶WZHHWVPHDQWKDWWKHWRWDOLW\RIWKHRSLQLRQVH[SUHVVHGRQ7ZLWWHU± often 
by users with very few followers and very little interaction ± are missed. Thus, in turn, primacy 
LVJLYHQWRµLQIOXHQFH¶UDWKHUWKDQEUHDGWKRIYRLFHDQGRSLQLRQ:KLOHLQIOXHQFHLVLPSRUWDQWRI
course, further studies should attempt to map the totality of the political opinion expressed by 
µ2USKDQV¶WKXVSURYLGLQJDPXFKPRUHQXDQFHGand likely complex) map of the use of Twitter. 
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